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Abstract 
The 1981 South Africa rugby tour of New Zealand brought widespread protest and global 
attention. It should be understood in an international context. Both anti-tour protestors and 
the New Zealand government viewed international perceptions of New Zealand as important 
and interacted with institutions and individuals around the world to influence them. For the 
New Zealand government, in addition to domestic considerations, relations with Britain were 
important for trade, geopolitical, and cultural reasons. Protestors drew inspiration from 
antiapartheid protests in Britain stretching back to the late 1950s, along with activism around 
Africa and throughout the Western world. The tour also needs to be viewed in the context of 
the cold war and international trade, which directly influenced British and U.S. policy toward 
South Africa and had a vicarious effect on New Zealand’s attitude toward South Africa 
sporting contacts. 
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Introduction 
On July 25, 1981, approximately four hundred antiapartheid protestors tore down a perimeter 
fence at Rugby Park in Hamilton, New Zealand, pushed past irate rugby fans on the terraces, 
and invaded the playing field. Linking arms in the middle, preventing kick-off between 
Waikato and the South Africa Springboks rugby team, they repeatedly chanted “[T]he whole 
world’s watching!”1 The global media audiences were indeed vast, including rugby fans in 
South Africa watching their first-ever live overseas sports broadcast; however, one important 
person was not watching. New Zealand Prime Minister Robert Muldoon was en route to 
London to meet leaders of other Commonwealth nations, where he hoped to salvage New 
Zealand’s hosting of the Commonwealth Finance Ministers’ Meeting that September. He was 
also going to attend the wedding of the Prince of Wales and Lady Diana Spencer at St Paul’s 
Cathedral on July 29, 1981.2 
 Even in the most stressful, violent moments of the Springbok rugby union tour of 
New Zealand in 1981, those on either side of the conflic--protestors and the New Zealand 
prime ministe--were concerned with international perceptions. This is not to say domestic 
issues did not influence the protests; the government’s precarious political and economic 
position, the mobilization of marginalized groups, a rise in nationalism and conservatism in 
New Zealand politics, dispute over whether sports boycotts were an acceptable antiapartheid 
protest tactic, policing methods, and the combative personal style of Prime Minister Muldoon 
all played a part in polarizing opinion and stoking dissent. However, the tour was also a battle 
for global opinion, a point sometimes neglected in the historiography. Much (but by no 
means all) of the literature written about the tour has been inserted into a “national” story, 
suggesting New Zealand was on a linear path from loyal British colony in the late 1800s to an 
increasingly independent and liberal nation from the 1960s onward.3 This mirrored the 
historiographical tradition, increasingly challenged by revisionists, placing Britain’s global 
influence on an inevitable and equally linear decline through the twentieth century.4 The story 
often pits New Zealand’s liberal and conservative forces against each other: new ideas versus 
old, colonized versus oppressors, urban versus rural, educated versus narrow-minded in a 
regrettable, Manichean struggle for the moral high ground. Blame for the tour is often 
directed at a selfish, stubborn New Zealand Rugby Football Union and a government 
following a “no politics in sport” and “law and order” mantra while cynically courting rural 
provincial voters for an upcoming election. Such domestically focused narratives often follow 
brave (or feckless) protestors battling escalating police forces, who themselves are perceived 
as brutally violent or, in the case of Hamilton, incompetent.5 
 The tour looms large in New Zealand’s popular memory. A TVNZ documentary 
screened on the twenty-year anniversary titled 1981: New Zealand at War talked of events 
that “changed New Zealand for ever.” Te Papa, the national museum, described it as “among 
the most divisive events in New Zealand’s history.” Trevor Richards, an integral figure in the 
protest movement, said it was “the closest New Zealand has come to civil war in the 
twentieth century.”8 The cover sleeve of his book on the subject says “the tour of 1981 is writ 
large in New Zealand’s history.” 
 Yet, despite the hyperbole, relatively few professional historians have tackled the 
events of 1981. The bulk has been written by those intimate with the protest movements. 
Tom Newnham, Geoff Chapple, Juliet Morris, and Lindsay Wright all protested and 
published books in the three years following 1981, while riot squad commander Ross 
Meurant offered a first-hand account of police action.10 Humanities and social science 
departments in New Zealand universities had a short burst of activity following the tour, with 
the University of Canterbury establishing an archive and Victoria University of Wellington 
producing a series of papers looking at social and economic impacts.11 Don Cameron 
captured events from the perspective of a sports journalist. The protests receive summary 
attention in national narrative histories by James Belich, Michael King, and Philippa Mein 
Smith; while varying in significance, each portrays the tour as an agent of social change, 
contributing to or demonstrating a sense of national progression. Barry Gustafson dedicated a 
chapter to the tour in his biography of Robert Muldoon, suggesting it represented a 
“generational and attitudinal clash.” Ranginui Walker and Aroha Harris have evaluated its 
(largely positive) effect on the Māori protest movement. Harris notes that, in addition to 
temporarily ending racist sport, the protests increased support for Māori rights, including that 
from Pākehā (New Zealanders of European descent) and church groups.15 
 There has been a smattering of journal articles, book chapters, and academic theses, 
including sociologists and political scientists looking at the tour through the prism of 
ethnicity, class, gender, or sport in New Zealand culture. Views differ on the effect of 1981; 
some see it as a turning point, while others note, but do not overstate, the tour’s importance in 
the context of rising feminism, Māori rights, reactionary conservatism, economic turbulence, 
independent foreign policy, and the extensive liberal economic reforms implemented by the 
fourth Labour government, 1984-1990.16 
 Those who have looked at the tour as international history, albeit as part of broader 
narratives, include Douglas Booth, Martha Evans, David Black, and John Nauright, who 
discuss the tour’s effect in South Africa as part of broader research on television’s impact on 
apartheid and rugby’s role in South African nation building. Diplomatic historian Malcolm 
McKinnon sees the New Zealand Government exercising dissent in the face of foreign 
pressure, sacrificing (or not caring) about international opinion to retain domestic political 
power. He also references a growth in both left- and right-wing nationalism influencing New 
Zealand’s foreign policy in the 1980s. Malcolm Templeton’s Human Rights and Sporting 
Contacts chronicles policy changes and diplomatic correspondence that led into the 1981 tour 
and beyond. He too is sympathetic to the anti-apartheid movement and is critical of the 
government for not doing more to stop South Africa contacts, largely in keeping with the 
New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs’s policy advice throughout the period (the author 
was a former foreign policy officer.)19 
 Malcolm MacLean also helpfully puts the South Africa sporting contacts in an 
international context, noting that sports boycott campaign was one of the “principal tools” to 
dismantle the apartheid system. Dancing on Our Bones by Trevor Richards uses some 
academic rigour, as well as being a semi-autobiographical account of the author’s time as 
chairman and international secretary of Halt All Racist Tours (HART) from 1969 to 1985. 
Richards places the tour in a long line of New Zealand protests against racist sport beginning 
in 1921 and charts the international connections fostered by himself and others in the protest 
movement.21 
 Such efforts, while useful, leave gaps, particularly in understanding how pro- and 
anti-tour factions competed to project an image of New Zealand, what Benedict Anderson 
calls the “nation as an imagined community,” to the rest of the world.22 Likewise, they often 
fail to show how the perceived international reputation of New Zealand was used by both 
sides of the dispute to influence domestic opinion. These efforts were facilitated by networks 
and emerging technologies.23 Those placing the tour in the “whiggish” context of New 
Zealand’s national progress and increased independence tend to overlook evidence that both 
pro- and anti-tour advocates looked out to the world for inspiration, in particular, southern 
Africa, Britain, and elsewhere in the Western world. This article aims to show that the dispute 
was fought as much with telexes, press releases, and satellites as with batons, barbed wire, 
and flour bombs. Viewed this way, the tour can be better conceptualized, not solely as a 
demonstration of New Zealand’s postcolonial independence but as case study of international 
networks, with particularly strong links between the former imperial hub of London and 
nodes in its former colony, 18,000 kilometres away.24 
 It is not a catch-all narrative. The reaction within South Africa is not included and has 
already been researched by David Black, John Nauright, and others.25 Nor is the Springboks 
visit to the United States after departing New Zealand included, which also met with 
controversy and protest, along with a pipe bomb.26 The research relies predominantly on New 
Zealand government archives, particularly communications to and from diplomatic posts, the 
United Nations , and governments of other nations. It also draws upon files of the 
Commonwealth Secretariat, which played an important role in the sports boycott against 
South Africa, and the British government. Papers and propaganda of the protest groups and 
political opposition have been reviewed, along with media reports and television 
documentaries. It has not been possible to access archives of the New Zealand or South 
Africa Rugby Unions. Neither does the article reference the archives of the “new 
Commonwealth,” Australian, Canadian, or United States governments, which would likely 
contain nuggets if time and space allowed. 
 New Zealand’s sporting contacts with South Africa and resultant protests help 
illuminate international history of the twentieth century. As James Belich puts it, “[A]part 
from history, there are only two spheres in which New Zealand has been a world superpower. 
One is the export of protein. The other is sport.” According to Belich, New Zealanders’ 
participation in rugby union, particularly the national All Black team (named after the color 
of their uniforms,) has for most of the twentieth century embodied “Better Britishness.” That 
is, attempting to prove New Zealanders more than any other people display the perceived 
British characteristics of manliness, fairness, and racial superiority (an optimum blend of 
Scots, English, and Welsh, while supposedly integrating Māori on an equal basis). Greg Ryan 
notes that rugby endowed the New Zealand nation (as it was perceived domestically and 
internationally) with qualities of innovation, rural pragmatism, and egalitarianism. These 
ideals resonated in the British metropolis, where sport and other cultural and economic 
interaction in the twentieth century enabled New Zealand to reinvent itself as an extension of 
Britain: a pleasant, egalitarian farming hinterland, perhaps analogous to Devon or Hampshire, 
despite being 18,000 kilometres away.30 Such cultural reinvention has interesting parallels 
and contrasts in other settler societies, which in itself warrants further study of the New 
Zealand example. 
 
Sports Boycotts and the Anti-Apartheid Movement in an International Context 
Increasingly, historians are recognizing connections and continuities in colonization across 
the English-speaking world, particularly in the long nineteenth-century.31 This is also true of 
the antiapartheid movement. Rob Skinner has shown moral debates originating from the 
South African War, 1899-1902, particularly influenced by Christianity and missionary 
endeavors, extended through to the extensive global antiapartheid activism in the 1970s and 
1980s. He argues networks of personal imperial connections generated exchanges of 
knowledge that later enabled antiapartheid activism. Such ideas are compatible with thinking 
on global networks by Chris Wickham, John Darwin, Margret Frenz, and James Belich, 
whereby technologies help or hinder the transmission of culture, capital, goods and people 
between “hubs” (such as London, in the case of British imperialism) and “nodes” in 
colonies.33 
 This helps explain how the antiapartheid and sports boycott movements traveled vast 
distances of time and space, from origins in imperial South Africa to the British metropolis of 
London in the era of decolonization, then to outlying but important former colonies such as 
New Zealand. As Roger Fieldhouse has shown, the British antiapartheid movement has 
always had an international dimension. It was given impetus by the Boycott Committee 
founded in Britain in 1952 and was influenced by decolonization organizations in Africa and 
elsewhere, as well as multilateral organizations such as the UN, labor movements, and 
religious groups. It was stimulated by the hardening of the South Africa apartheid regime, 
Sharpeville Massacre, and South Africa’s exit from the Commonwealth in 1960 and the 
transformation of the African National Congress into an armed organization with leadership 
in exile or prison in the 1970s.34 
 The antiapartheid and South Africa boycott movements (including sporting boycotts) 
have their origins in southern Africa; however, London was integral to their globalization. 
The British capital was a purveyor of radicalism, as well as conservative thought. Britain long 
had channels for disseminating political thought and culture to its global interests and vice-
versa, and the antiapartheid movement was ready and willing to use these channels for its 
own ends.35 The coalition initially opposing apartheid included the Committee of African 
Organisations, largely made up of Africans agitating for anticolonialism. They allied 
themselves with the emerging peace and antinuclear movements and opponents of racism in 
Britain. Trade unions, churches, and Britain’s growing black communities were represented, 
calling for antiapartheid movements to be established not only in Britain and southern Africa 
but across the English-speaking world. From at least the 1930s, London and Oxbridge were 
the places of education for many anticolonial elites.36 Such groups were increasingly helped 
by improved telecommunications, mass media, and the advent of jet air travel.37 The concept 
of “boycott” was itself derived from disparate parts of the British Empire. References to 
boycotts were initially used by the nationalist movement in Ireland. Mahatma Gandhi 
instigated boycotts against businesses, taxes, courts, and foreign cloth in India. South African 
activists were influenced by Gandhi, who had spent his formative political years advocating 
for civil rights in Durban and Johannesburg.38 
 Britain’s antiapartheid movement was aligned against successive British 
governments, which justified inaction toward South Africa’s racial segregation policies, 
legislated since 1948, in several ways. First and perhaps foremost, Britain did not want to 
damage economic relations with southern Africa (particularly the lucrative minerals trade). 
There are plentiful examples of the Cabinet using business interests as the primary 
determinant of foreign policy decisions, especially in times of economic distress.39 There 
were other reasons, too. Prior to 1961, Britain sought to keep South Africa within the 
Commonwealth; then, after it withdrew in that year, ministers often used its sovereign status 
as a reason not to interfere. There was also a desire to maintain South Africa’s support for 
British policy in Rhodesia and to limit Soviet influence in the region (an objective strongly 
supported by the United States.) Early in the antiapartheid struggle, before the widespread 
public critique of racial hierarchies, there was a conscious or unconscious failure to recognize 
the inherent inequities in the apartheid regime. This can variously be explained by structural 
racial prejudice, cynical pragmatism, or naiveté. Although of lesser importance, some Britons 
also had personal connections to white communities in southern Africa, which may have 
engendered sympathy for policies of the South African government.40 
 Legitimization of sports boycotts to influence South African racial policies was in part 
facilitated by the changing structure of sport administration in the 1960s. Newly formed 
multilateral sports organizations such as the Permanent General Assembly of National 
Olympic Committees and the General Assembly of International Federations challenged 
sports bodies hitherto based on imperial lines, dominated by white, Western communities. 
Communist bloc and third-world nations, including those recently decolonized in Africa and 
the Caribbean, began to coalesce within these organizations to challenge the status quo. In 
1963, the South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee (SANROC) asked all Olympic 
nations to join the struggle against racist sport. Another of these new pannational 
organizations constituted by recently decolonized nations, the Supreme Council for Sport in 
Africa, voted in 1966 to “use every means” to expel South Africa from international sport.41 
Even though it was not until 1970 that the International Olympic Committee narrowly voted 
to expel South Africa, it was clear that nations formerly on the periphery of world sport and 
politics were now more influential. 
 Protests against South African sporting contacts were taken up with alacrity in 
Britain. Demonstrations against the 1969 South Africa rugby tour of Britain and Ireland, 
organized by Peter Hain, Dennis Brutus, and the National League of Young Liberals, have 
been described by Rob Nixon as “the most successful mass action in post<EN>-World War 
II British history.” The result, as in New Zealand in 1981, was rugby played behind barbed 
wire with large-scale police presence. The 1970 South Africa cricket tour of England was 
subsequently cancelled. Widespread protests also accompanied the 1971 South Africa rugby 
tour of Australia, which particularly resonated with New Zealand audiences.43 Protestors 
recognized sport’s ability to generate substantial media interest, especially from the newly 
dominant medium of television, and to engage a large and influential portion of the populace 
who previously had little interest in international politics. A case in point is the Basil 
D’Oliveira affair of 1968-69, which saw South African Prime Minister John Vorster refuse to 
allow a South African-born Cape-“coloured” cricketer to tour the republic with the England 
cricket team. It prompted criticism from sports followers because politics were now seen to 
interfere with sports’ ethics. Former Conservative British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan 
described it as “beyond the pale of civilised cricket.”44 
 The history of antiapartheid protest in Britain is relevant to the 1981 Springbok tour 
because it closely mirrors the New Zealand experience. From 1921 to 1960, New Zealanders’ 
protest and indignation were STET largely directed toward treatment of Māori players, who 
were excluded from touring South Africa at the request of the hosts. This led to the creation 
of groups such as the Citizens’ All Black Tour Association (CABTA) and the “No Māori—
No Tour” movement of 1959-60. Despite this, up until the 1960s, there was relatively little 
criticism in New Zealand of treatment of the black population in South Africa (at least from 
Pākehā, the term for New Zealanders of European descent).45 In 1964, partly emulating the 
British equivalents, Citizens Association for Racial Equality (CARE) was founded in 
Auckland by Harold Inness to campaign against racist policies. Before long, sport was an 
important focus of activity; in 1965, CARE issued An Appeal to Conscience asking New 
Zealanders not to attend that year’s tour games played by the South Africa rugby team.46 In 
1969, Halt all Racist Tours (HART) was established in New Zealand to campaign specifically 
against sporting contact with South Africa;STET it later merged with the New Zealand Anti-
Apartheid Council in 1980 partly as a response to a government campaign to discredit it and 
was among several new antiapartheid activist groups established in the 1960s and ‘70s.47 
These movements, allied with international pressure, had some success. An outbound All 
Black tour to South Africa was cancelled in 1967 and the New Zealand government under 
Labour Prime Minister Norman Kirk prevented the 1973 inbound South Africa tour. A New 
Zealand rugby team did tour South Africa in 1970 but was heavily criticized (as a 
compromise, three Māori and one Samoan New Zealander were included in the squad after 
being designated “honorary whites” by the South African government.)48 
 Looking back in his memoirs, HART founding chairman Trevor Richards saw himself 
joining an internationalist movement that challenged the established order across the Western 
world, campaigning on issues such as Vietnam, Biafra, nuclear testing, and South Africa. 
Like CARE and the New Zealand Anti-Apartheid Council, throughout the 1970s and 1980s, 
HART created links with international movements elsewhere, not only in countries such as 
Britain, Australia, South Africa, Nigeria, and Tanzania but with multilateral organizations 
such as the United Nations, Supreme Council for Sport in Africa, International Olympic 
Committee, and, as we shall see, the Commonwealth Secretariat based in London. Close 
connections were formed with key southern African liberation groups, including the ANC, 
South West African People’s Organisation (SWAPO), Pan Africanist Congress and others. 
Like in Britain, protest groups such as HART and CARE were often allied with New 
Zealand’s trade union movement and major church denominations, which also had strong 
international links.49 
 The New Zealand government had its own international concerns. Since the invention 
of refrigeration in the 1880s, the country had maintained a close trading relationship with 
Britain based on New Zealand’s export of dairy and sheep products. In return, New Zealand 
“imported” British culture and goods, which, it has been argued, recolonized the nation as 
“Better Britain,” controlled by a politically dominant farming elite. The relationship largely 
suited both metropolis and colony: in the 1950s, New Zealand boasted one of the highest 
living standards in the world.50 However, from the 1960s to the 1980s, this economic, 
political, and cultural edifice, dubbed “the protein bridge” by James Belich, was under 
threat.51 Britain’s economic difficulties and its repeated attempts to join the European 
Economic Community (EEC) threatened to bring prohibitive trade barriers for New Zealand 
commodities. Britain eventually entered the EEC in 1973, negotiating a five-year partial tariff 
and quota exemption for New Zealand butter and cheese.52 From the early 1960s to the 
1990s, as New Zealand Prime Minister Robert Muldoon put it, “[O]ur foreign policy is 
trade.”53 While also seeking to diversify markets, New Zealand governments made greater 
trade access to Europe a primary foreign policy objective, pressing Britain to make the case 
to the EEC.54 They were encouraged by the belief that New Zealand’s dairy quota would 
increase over time as Britain gained influence in Europe.55 In 1977, New Zealand Prime 
Minister Rob Muldoon noted the OPEC oil crisis had caused New Zealand’s sharpest fall in 
export receipts since 1928. The solution, he felt, still lay in Britain’s hands: “I must record 
the great weight we attach to working with Britain in current and international economic 
discussions. . . . Sense will prevail in accessing the British trade market.”56 Indeed, in March 
1981. the EEC Council of Agricultural Ministers authorized Britain to import special quotas 
of New Zealand butter at a reduced levy.57 
 This relationship partly explains why New Zealand’s policy on contacts with South 
Africa so closely resembled Britain’s during the late 1970s and 1980s, even when other 
“white” Commonwealth nations like Australia and Canada began to disassociate from the 
apartheid regime. From the mid-1940s to the 1960s, the New Zealand government largely 
justified inaction toward apartheid through a policy of “domestic jurisdiction.” Along with 
other white Commonwealth nations, New Zealand argued that the UN should prioritize 
collective security over internal issues in other states and frequently opposed or abstained 
from UN antiapartheid resolutions.58 This view softened over time, particularly with the 
Norman Kirk-led Labour government of 1972-75, although New Zealand was slower to 
change than most. Much like the British government, from the election of the National Party 
in 1975, the New Zealand government’s policy held that, while apartheid was deplorable and 
in need of reform, the government could not legally interfere (“coerce” was often the verb 
used) to prevent sporting contacts with nonracially selected South African teams.59 The claim 
that New Zealand’s policy was in line with Britain was used many times in the lead up to 
1981 and beyond, although not often mentioned was the fact that Britain practiced an indirect 
sanction by removing government funding for sports bodies that had contact with South 
Africa, something New Zealand often did not.60 The policy was one of six major platforms in 
the New Zealand National Party 1975 election manifesto, which said, “[E]very New 
Zealander should be free to have contact or to play sport with . . . anyone in the world.”61 It 
stood in contrast to the Labour Party, which had prevented the 1973 South Africa tour. The 
National Party under Rob Muldoon duly won the 1975 election and did not stop the All 
Blacks from touring South Africa in 1976. This was despite New Zealand’s signing a 
unanimous UN General Assembly resolution the previous November calling on all 
governments and sports bodies to avoid sports contact with South Africa.62 
 Arguably the nadir of New Zealand’s international reputation came in the aftermath of 
the 1976 South Africa rugby tour, rather than in 1981. The government seemed to 
underestimate the impact globally and domestically, despite a warning by Abraham Ordia, 
president of the Supreme Council for Sport in Africa, of boycotts of the Olympics by African 
nations and their allies should the All Blacks tour proceed. “Time will tell,” was Muldoon’s 
response to the boycott threat.63 The 1976 tour coincided with the Soweto uprising, adding to 
the international outrage, and twenty-eight African, Middle Eastern, Asian, and Caribbean 
nations protested New Zealand’s presence at the 1976 Montreal Olympics by calling their 
athletes home before the opening ceremony.64 
 The outcry led to a further softening of New Zealand’s policy and the signing of the 
Gleneagles Agreement at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) in 
June 1977. Gleneagles was instigated by Commonwealth Secretary-General Sir Shridath 
Ramphal and committed governments and sports bodies to take “every practical step to 
discourage” sporting contact with South Africa.65 At Muldoon’s behest, the agreement 
remained vague enough to avoid the New Zealand government from having to use coercive 
powers such as withdrawing visas and passports; however, to the outside world, it looked as 
if New Zealand was finally falling into line with global opinion. It seems Muldoon either 
thought or hoped the shift in domestic public opinion would make a future South Africa 
rugby tour unlikely.66 In explaining Gleneagles to journalists, Muldoon pointed out, as usual, 
that it aligned with the existing policy of the British government. He also predicted “the [New 
Zealand] Rugby Union is not going to invite a Springbok team here. . . . [T]he next team that 
comes will be when South African rugby is totally integrated at all levels.”67 
 Of course, Muldoon was wrong. In September 1980, the New Zealand Rugby 
Football Union (NZRFU) invited the South Africa team to tour, but not before New Zealand 
Foreign Minister Brian Talboys went to some effort to dissuade them on the basis they would 
contravene the Gleneagles Agreement. On April 9, 1980, Talboys wrote to Ces Blazey, 
chairman of NZRFU: 
“A Springbok tour would dash to the ground all that has been achieved as a result of 
international acceptance. . . . that New Zealand does not in any way condone . . . the 
apartheid regime in South Africa. . . . [The tour] may affect the harmonious development of 
the Commonwealth and international sport.”68 
 Talboys exerted public pressure too, telling a London press conference in October 
1980 that New Zealand public opinion was moving away from the tour proceeding because of 
the 
“experience of the Montreal Olympics. I might even claim some success myself in seeking to 
persuade New Zealanders that we do not live in a white Anglo-Saxon world. We live in a 
world in which New Zealand has to develop . . . associations with people of different 
cultures. I think to some extent this obviously is happening.69 
  
Talboys was more inclined to prevent South African sporting contacts than his prime 
minister; however, rhetoric from both suggested that a South Africa rugby tour of New 
Zealand would not take place in 1981. This created a greater sense of indignation when the 
tour proceeded, stirred in part by perceptions that New Zealand had not fulfilled an 
international commitment. 
 
The 1981 Tour as an International Dispute 
The NZRFU decision to invite the Springboks to tour had a recent precedent. Predictably, this 
came from Britain, with the British and Irish Lions rugby team touring South Africa in 
May<EN>-July 1980. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher outlined her government’s reasons 
for not preventing the Lions tour in a letter to Abraham Ordia in May 1980. She reiterated 
that Britain remains “firmly opposed to the policy of apartheid,” that it “publicly deplored” 
the Lions’ decision to tour South Africa, and that it “fully accepts the Gleneagles 
Agreement.” She went on to say, however, that Britain’s democratic traditions did not permit 
withdrawal of passports and, therefore, the government could do nothing further to prevent 
the tour from proceeding. She also noted that no government assistance was provided to the 
touring team. In Thatcher’s view, this removed any inconsistency in approach between the 
Lions touring South Africa and the 1980 Moscow Olympics, ahead of which the government 
had withdrawn funding for the British Olympic Association to attempt to prevent British 
athletes competing.70 
 Not only was Britain’s policy echoed by the New Zealand government throughout 
1981, but it gave the NZRFU further justification for the Springbok tour invitation. Blazey 
explicitly referred to the Lions tour precedent in a letter to Talboys explaining the NZRFU 
decision. In response to fears of a boycott of the 1982 Commonwealth Games by African 
nations, Blazey claimed that, thanks to the 1980 Lions tour, “upset of the 1982 
Commonwealth Games already exists.”71 Talboys was critical of NZRFU’s disregard for the 
Gleneagles Agreement and later made an emotional plea to Blazey: “[F]or the sake of other 
New Zealand sportsmen, to avoid dividing and damaging our society and for the international 
reputation of your country, I ask you to think again.”72 Blazey and the NZRFU board would 
not change their decision, and the tour began as planned in Gisborne on July 22, 1981. 
 The NZRFU decision was predictably greeted with criticism from around the world. 
The Commonwealth Secretariat said the news had been “received with revulsion throughout 
the Commonwealth” and STET “an expression of contempt for international obligations.”73 
Sam Ramsamy, chair of the South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee (SANROC) 
claimed that, in retaliation, African states would not attend the 1982 Commonwealth Games 
and Arab states would boycott NZ$400m worth of New Zealand trade.74 Alexander Ross, 
chair of the Commonwealth Games Federation, was concerned about the impact on the 1982 
games and expressed “extreme disquiet.”75 
 The Australian government was also alarmed. New Zealand’s actions meant that, in 
addition to the at-risk Commonwealth Games, potential existed for a boycott of the 
Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting due to be hosted in Melbourne in October 
1981. An Australian Department of Foreign Affairs circular felt New Zealand “singled itself 
out by disappointing expectations aroused in Commonwealth countries by the Gleneagles 
Agreement.”76 Commonwealth secretariat advisor (and former All Black) Chris Laidlaw, 
after speaking to the Australian Foreign Department, predicted “open conflict” between the 
Australian and New Zealand governments should the tour proceed.77 As well as conveying 
concerns to New Zealand directly, Australia also attempted to bring pressure to bear from the 
United States, warning the Soviet bloc would use the issue as an excuse to boycott the 1984 
Los Angeles Olympics.78 
 On the other hand, the response from Britain was muted. Conscious of trade with 
South Africa and its own recent sporting contacts, British officials said New Zealand’s 
actions were consistent with the Gleneagles Agreement and that the New Zealand 
government should not withhold visas to the South Africans.79 There was some parliamentary 
and media pressure on this view, especially when it became known the British consulate in 
Pretoria issued visas on New Zealand’s behalf, and there were suggestions the Springboks 
would transit through Hong Kong, a Crown colony (in the end, STET the team transited via 
the United States both ways, after Australia declined access to its airports for refuelling). 
Lord Carrington, secretary of state for foreign and commonwealth affairs, was asked in the 
House of Lords whether the British government would withhold assistance. The reply was 
negative.80 This comfortably conformed to Britain’s previous policy statements. The Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office (FCO) also attempted to alleviate international pressure on New 
Zealand. Roger Baltrop, head of the FCO’s Commonwealth Division, offered to write to 
Commonwealth Secretary-General Ramphal to “reduce the temperature” on the issue, 
advising that, in Britain’s view, the tour would not contravene the Gleneagles Agreement.81 
 Both the anti-tour movement and New Zealand government proactively engaged with 
international, as well as New Zealand, news media to convey their points of view. Anti-tour 
activists such as writer James McNeish and former All Black and diplomat Chris Laidlaw 
wrote opinion pieces or undertook interviews in the British national newspapers. Other 
eminent New Zealanders, including academics, wrote letters to the editors of the leading 
British newspapers.82 This suggests they saw London-based media as important to their 
cause, in part because, as a global “hub” with vast international links, messages conveyed via 
London media were more likely to reach southern Africa. Muldoon gave numerous 
interviews to the British press and publicly lauded the way its newspapers reported the 
position of the New Zealand government, criticizing the domestic media for not taking the 
same approach.84 
 There was significant international media interest in the tour, attracted by the strong 
words of intergovernmental organizations and the prospect of violent confrontation. Over 150 
foreign journalists journeyed to New Zealand, including twelve UK Press Association 
correspondents and reporters from all major newspapers and television networks in Britain, 
Australia, and South Africa. CBS and NBC television crews came from the United States, 
which had only happened previously on state visits and after the Mount Erebus air disaster in 
1979.85 This number of journalists could not have moved around provincial New Zealand 
unnoticed, adding to the sense that the tour placed the nation on the world stage. Global 
media attendance was also reported by domestic media, relaying the international 
significance of the event to the New Zealand population.86 
 The presence of international media was facilitated by improvements to New 
Zealand’s telecommunications in the 1970s. News was filed almost instantly over vast 
distances via cable, telephone, or satellite broadcast, something impossible on the previous 
Springbok tour in 1965 (New Zealand’s first satellite station was installed in 1971).87 The 
tour also featured the first live television broadcast to South Africa, coincidently the 
cancelled game in Hamilton, but only after significant debate and strike threats within the 
New Zealand Broadcasting Corporation.88 
 It is occasionally claimed the tour created or reflected a clear rural/urban divide in 
New Zealand, with pro-tour sentiment coming from predominantly older, less educated, 
provincial demographics and anti-tour movements largely made up of city-dwelling, 
educated, and marginalized groups (such as women and Māori).89 However, a closer look at 
the statistics creates a more complex picture. A New Zealand Herald poll from the end of 
July 1981 showed 42 percent of New Zealanders in favor of the tour and 49 percent against 
(the numbers against had perceptibly increased during the tour, probably due to the disruption 
caused.) Conforming to the accepted narrative, larger centers Wellington (57 percent), 
Christchurch (57 percent), and Dunedin (68 percent) all had relatively clear majorities against 
the tour; however, Auckland, New Zealand’s biggest city, was less clear cut, with only 50 
percent being anti-tour. Moreover, small towns such as Greymouth were clearly anti-tour 
(perhaps in this case because it did not have a match scheduled,) while more substantial 
provincial centers like Hamilton and Invercargill were pro-tour. Rotorua and Gisborne both 
had large Māori populations, yet the former was substantially pro-tour and the latter was anti-
. Aroha Harris has suggested divisions among Māori, with many activists and the Māori 
Council firmly opposed, while more conservative institutions were ambiguous.91 
 The lack of statistical clarity suggests than being in an urban or rural location was not 
the best indicator of anti- or pro-tour sympathies. A better gauge may be the image of New 
Zealand that a particular person, group, or community wanted to uphold and portray to the 
rest of the world. This becomes clear when reviewing the communication of anti-tour 
activists, many of whom were concerned about how “New Zealand” was defined, particularly 
internationally. Mobilisation to Stop the Tour (MOST), an Auckland-based coalition 
established for the 1981 protests, told its supporters, “New Zealand’s place in the whole 
human community will be in your hands.”92 Derek Wilson, on the Left of the Labour Party, 
saw New Zealand’s antiapartheid protests as contributing to the worldwide struggle against 
international capitalism. A HART newsletter said the tour should be opposed because it “will 
be a further attack on New Zealand’s so-called egalitarian, multi-racial society.” The 
campaign group Artists against Apartheid put it explicitly: “It was like a battle for a 
definition of a society.”95 
 It was not just those on the traditional Left who were anti-tour. Opposition also came 
from social, economic, and sporting elites, who saw it as running counter to their notion of 
New Zealand, especially as it pertained to the outside world. Graham Mourie, incumbent All 
Black captain and a farmer from the ostensibly pro-tour Taranaki province, chose not to play 
in 1981 for “moral” reasons. He argued New Zealand was losing in world opinion, even if it 
won on the pitch.96 
 Some business leaders were also anti-tour. New Zealanders had spent a century 
cultivating a reputation as a trading nation and some thought the tour jeopardised this. Former 
All Black captains Wilson Whineray, a senior business executive, and John Graham, 
headmaster of a leading secondary school, publicly denounced the tour, with Graham writing 
in the Auckland Star, “The standing of New Zealand world-wide is very important from a 
position of economic well-being and we simply can’t put ourselves in a position where 
countries . . . have any reason not to trade with us.”97 Fred Turnovsky, another successful 
exporting businessman, wrote to Governor-General David Beattie asking him to press 
Muldoon to stop the tour: “Our international standing is threatened. . . . In the past 50 years 
we have been developing a viable, participatory democracy, intelligent, caring and 
multicultural.”98 Businessmen such as Turnovsky and Whineray were involved in export 
markets outside Britain so may have seen the tour as more costly than farming communities 
that still heavily relied on Britain. The New Zealand Meat Board supported the government 
by publicly doubting the tour would have a negative effect on trade, although, as in the case 
of Mourie, it was clear some farmers were anti-tour.99 
 Interaction with international organizations was integral to the anti-tour movement. 
As we have seen, HART and CARE derived from 1960s international protest movements, 
and their evolution mirrored that of Britain. Throughout 1981, they invited activists from 
Africa, Australia, and elsewhere to address protest gatherings in New Zealand.100 Protest 
groups also relied on international bodies for financial support. In September 1980, World 
Council of Churches donated NZ$5,000 to HART to ease its financial situation, which at that 
time included debts of over NZ$3,300.101 Leadership of mainstream religious denominations 
were predominantly anti-tour (although their congregations may have been divided). Rector 
John Weir, an active protestor, felt Pope John-Paul’s II’s call to confront human rights abuses 
was a significant factor in Catholic opposition.102 
 As international secretary of HART, Trevor Richards was specifically employed to 
generate international support. As well as African activist groups, he was a regular 
correspondent with the United Nations Centre against Apartheid, the Commonwealth 
Secretariat, New Zealand diplomats, and foreign affairs ministries of other Commonwealth 
countries. He wrote to Chris Laidlaw in the Commonwealth Secretariat in September 1981: 
“75,000 people from 29 centres throughout New Zealand participated in marches and rallies 
against the Springbok tour. An immediate international response . . . would greatly help 
further build the campaign in New Zealand.”103 
 Richards was not alone in establishing an international network. Ramphal’s files in 
the Commonwealth Secretariat include letters from New Zealanders asking him to pressure 
the New Zealand government and the NZRFU to prevent the tour. Some wrote on behalf of 
influential organizations, such as Leader of the Opposition Bill Rowling and President of 
New Zealand Federation of Labour Ken Douglas. There were also letters from individual 
New Zealanders concerned at the impact the tour would have on perceptions of their 
country.104 This suggests international activism was also happening at the grassroots of New 
Zealand society in 1981. 
 Even as the tour was underway, protesters were weaving their actions into a 
“national” narrative and projecting this not only to other New Zealanders but to an 
international audience. C. K. Stead, an eminent writer, wrote in a newspaper column that 
“reports coming in from all over show New Zealand’s image abroad has been saved by those 
who protested. They are the patriots.”105 The national anthem “God Defend New Zealand” 
was frequently sung at protests, including in the middle of Rugby Park, Hamilton. Trevor 
Richards told fellow protestors, “The HART office has received calls from around the world; 
from London, from Paris, from Montreal, African states and from South Africa. The message 
. . . is the only people standing between New Zealand and total shame is the anti-tour 
movement.”106 Individual New Zealanders echoed this national “pride.” Terry Bell, traveling 
in Tanzania during the tour wrote of “feeling (openly) proud we came here from New 
Zealand.” Fred Turnovsky, having attended an UNESCO board meeting in Paris, wrote of his 
fellow board members being “greatly surprised by the strong disapproval displayed by New 
Zealanders of all walks of life, . . . This has without doubt helped to restore the respect New 
Zealand is held. . . . We can take some satisfaction from having saved New Zealand’s face.” 
Patriotism also existed among pro-tour advocates. David Sparks, a rugby supporter, after 
attending the cancelled game in Hamilton and witnessing violence outside the ground thought 
that “national pride had to be restored” and immediately installed a New Zealand flag at his 
home.109 
 It has been suggested that the New Zealand government sacrificed international 
reputation for domestic electoral gain in 1981.110 However, the behavior of Prime Minister 
Robert Muldoon in 1981 did not tally with someone who placed no importance on global 
opinion. As we have seen, he travelled to London during the tour to attempt to limit 
international fall out. He also frequently defended New Zealand’s record on race relations to 
international audiences. He derided “misinformation” propagated by the protest movements 
for damaging New Zealand’s international reputation, suggesting links to the Communist 
Party and KGB.111 At a meeting with pro- and anti-tour groups immediately after the tour, 
Muldoon said the international image of New Zealand was “the key thing.” In the same 
meeting, he claimed,“New Zealand’s international image is not as bad as made out,” 
explaining that the balance of rights struck between those wanting to play and watch sport 
and those protesting “stemmed from the British tradition (emphasis added).”112 Britain was 
arguably the place where international opinion mattered most to Muldoon. 
 
The Fall Out? 
It has been said the tour was a “watershed” in New Zealand history, changing the nation 
forever.113 This narrative obscures continuities, including policies toward South Africa that 
did not greatly change after 1981. Moreover, the international fallout from the tour was 
arguably not as great as imagined, with the protests enhancing New Zealand’s international 
standing (even if the policy allowing the tour to proceed did not). 
 The Commonwealth Finance Minsters’ Meeting (CFM), due in Auckland shortly after 
the tour’s conclusion in September 1981, was a revealing case study of New Zealand Prime 
Minister Rob Muldoon’s efforts to keep Britain and the other white Commonwealth nations 
onside. Unusually, Muldoon was finance minister as well as prime minister and so would 
have assumed a central role in the Auckland CFM. New Zealand officials carefully prepared 
the agenda to exclude the sensitive issue of South Africa; however, it did allow for 
socializing and showcasing New Zealand’s burgeoning tourism industry, with dinners, 
helicopter trips, and a vineyard visit for the finance ministers and their wives.114 
 On June 10 and 23, 1981, New Zealand’s high commissioner in London alerted 
Muldoon’s office to the prospect of African nations not attending the CFM because it 
coincided with the tour.115 Some nations, including Nigeria, flatly declined the invitation. 
Others pledged to attend on condition the tour was cancelled. Australia prevaricated, with 
Finance Minister John Howard saying his attendance would be “subject to other 
commitments.”116 These commitments were not explained; however, it was clear the 
Australians were concerned about boycotts of their own hosting of the Commonwealth Heads 
of Government Meeting (CHOGM) in October and the Commonwealth Games in Brisbane in 
1982.117 The only unconditional acceptance was Britain’s Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
Geoffrey Howe.118 
 Commonwealth Secretary-General Shridath Ramphal tried to delay a decision on New 
Zealand’s CFM hosting in the hope that the tour would be called off, a move supported by 
Australia.119 However, by the time Muldoon arrived in London to meet with other 
Commonwealth leaders on July 26, 1981, it was too late: the Commonwealth Committee on 
Southern Africa, made up of high commissioners, had resolved to move the CFM to the 
Bahamas. New Zealand’s instruction to diplomats through this process was telling. White 
Commonwealth nations were to be consulted on the New Zealand position first and 
presumably Muldoon expected support.120 It made little difference. Only Britain, New 
Zealand’s erstwhile ally on South Africa issues, spoke against moving the CFM, with Canada 
and Australia not dissenting from the majority view. Britain’s representative argued that New 
Zealand had fulfilled its Gleneagles obligations and that other Commonwealth principles 
such as “liberty of the individual” and a “free and democratic process” should be 
considered.121 Interestingly, the FCO declined to host the CFM in London, saying it was too 
busy with Britain’s presidency of the Council of European Communities.122 It is a small piece 
of evidence; however, prioritization of Europe above the Commonwealth may be indicative 
of Britain’s wider strategy. 
 Notwithstanding the CFM snub, it can be argued the scale of the anti-tour protests, 
combined with diplomatic efforts of Ramphal and Australia, in some ways helped New 
Zealand’s position internationally, preventing African boycotts of the CHOGM and the 1982 
Commonwealth Games. Ramphal let it be known that New Zealand’s invitation to the games 
could not legally be rescinded.123 He also made clear to Commonwealth members that the 
main target of sanctions should be South Africa (not New Zealand), that anti-tour protesters 
(rather than the NZRFU) represented the true position of New Zealand, and that, apart from 
the 1981 tour, New Zealand’s record since the Gleneagles Agreement had been good. His 
address following the decision to move the CFM paid public tribute to “the people of New 
Zealand who have taken a principled stand against apartheid.”124 The sentiment was echoed 
by the Tanzania President Julius Nyerere and separately, Zambia President Kenneth Kaunda 
who thanked “the people of New Zealand for the hard time they gave the rugby 
organisation.”125 The protests may have strengthened the New Zealand government’s hand in 
other ways, too; Tourism Minister Derek Quigley claimed the tour’s publicity helped attract 
international visitors, although this was met with incredulity.126 
 Muldoon’s tactics, meanwhile, remained combative and focused on winning the favor 
of Britain and the white Commonwealth nations. In protest at being stripped of its hosting, 
New Zealand did not send a delegate to the CFM in the Bahamas, a move preacknowledged 
by Britain (although Geoffrey Howe still went).127 At the CHOGM in October 1981, 
Muldoon threatened to pull out of the Gleneagles Agreement if an African boycott of the 
1982 Commonwealth Games went ahead.128 He wrote to Australian Prime Minister Malcolm 
Fraser: 
“There has been an intrusion of the methods which some of our Commonwealth colleagues 
use in their own countries but are alien to us. . . . I believe the countries of the old 
Commonwealth must resist such methods and gradually educate our newer colleagues in 
ways of democracy and rule of law.”129 
  
At an extraordinary meeting of the Commonwealth Games Federation in London in 
May 1982, Tanzania put forward a resolution to bar New Zealand from competing at the 
1982 games in Brisbane. It received little support; however, a Code of Conduct was agreed to 
strengthen the Gleneagles Agreement, better defining what constituted a breach. New 
Zealand and all other Commonwealth nations subsequently attended the Brisbane games, 
with the lack of boycott partly reflecting a change in strategy by the Supreme Council for 
Sport in Africa to isolate South Africa, rather than other African nations, from international 
sport. The Code of Conduct remained contentious for years to come; however, it seemed that, 
apart from being stripped of the CFM hosting and receiving widespread criticism, New 
Zealand largely escaped major diplomatic and sporting sanction for the 1981 tour.130 
 Some continuities in New Zealand’s foreign policy remained beyond 1981. During 
the 1982 Falklands crisis, New Zealand supported Britain by immediately banning all trade 
with Argentina, having repeatedly refused to do the same with South Africa in preceding 
years. The foreign affairs minister at the time felt the threat to Britain and the Commonwealth 
outweighed the importance of trade.131 In 1984, following the landslide election of the David 
Lange-led Labour government, New Zealand’s diplomatic ties with the apartheid regime 
were cut off, and a partial ban was placed on New Zealand gas exports to South Africa in 
1985 (broadly corresponding with policies in London and Washington.) However, despite 
much rhetoric, David Lange, like Muldoon in 1976, was unable to prevent an All Black tour 
to South Africa in 1985. It was two rugby club members arguing a breach of the NZRFU 
constitution that brought a judicial halt to the 1985 tour, removing the government from a 
bind. Lange was “enormously relieved.”132 His government, despite being widely perceived 
as pursuing more independent foreign affairs policies, still saw European trade access as a 
fundamental concern.133 
 
Conclusion 
Southern Africa is obviously important as the genesis and beneficiary of the global 
antiapartheid and sports boycotts movements; however, the significance of London as a hub 
can also be seen here. Although not the only location, the imperial metropolis helped 
globalize and coalesce conservative and radical thought at the end of the twentieth century, 
even after the formal bonds of empire had largely been severed. It did this partly through its 
pre-existing international links and new technologies, such as mass media, 
telecommunications, and jet air travel. In 1981, pro- and anti-tour groups used these links to 
define and project their ideal “New Zealand” not only to their compatriots but around the 
world. 
 This article aims to build on histories challenging the popular notion that the 1981 
tour represented a Manichean struggle between a “new” and “old” New Zealand, with the 
archaic values of an Anglo-centric country swept away by the force of the protest movement. 
It also tests the view that Muldoon’s government cynically traded New Zealand’s 
international reputation for electoral gain in 1981. The reality was more complicated. Of 
course, domestic processes were at play in New Zealand in 1981. A faltering economy linked 
to the failure of Muldoon’s “Think Big” economic policies, Māori activism, feminism, police 
tactics, the precarious political situation, and the government’s strong desire to win the 
upcoming election all played a part in events. There was also Muldoon’s uncompromising, 
aggressive political style, described by a contemporary as “sheer bloody-minded pig-
headedness.”134 However, the domestic considerations should not preclude recognition of 
international influences. Indeed, they often intersected with each other. Acknowledging this 
helps us better understand the history of the 1981 Springbok tour of New Zealand. 
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